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I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the apparent exit of the United Kingdom,1 the European Union (“EU”)2 has grown in membership and power since its
modest beginnings after World War II, now rivaling the U.S. in economic strength.3 With the goal of promoting the security and prosperity of all the citizens of the countries that belong to it, the EU is
pressing ahead to adopt laws that will promote their political and
financial integration.4 Along those lines, it has also recently acknowl1. The UK continues to have difficulty finding a way to arrange its departure
from the EU. Stephen Castle & Ellen Barry, May and Brexit Face Uncertain Future
After Crushing Vote in Parliament, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/01/15/world/europe/brexit-vote-theresa-may.html [https://perma.cc/TWC828AD]. Because of that, Boris Johnson has now replaced May as Prime Minister of
the U.K. See Sarah Lyall & Stephen Castle, Boris Johnson Becomes U.K. Prime Minister, Replacing Theresa May, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/07/24/world/europe/britain-johnson-may-prime-minister.html [https://perma.cc/
CKQ6-AK75].
2. Georgetown University’s Research Guide to the European Union contains
this description of the EU: “The European Union (EU) is a supranational organization that is currently composed of 27 European countries. The member countries have
decided to adopt uniform laws on a number of issues related to their economies, finances, and security.” European Union Research Guide, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://
guides.ll.georgetown.edu/EuropeanUnion (last visited June 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
2JAV-82HS].
3. Ignazio Visco, Governor of the Bank of Italy, Investment Financing in the European Union, Keynote Address at the OECD—Euromoney Conference on LongTerm Investment Financing (Nov. 19, 2015) at 3. The EU’s gross domestic product is
$5 trillion ahead of China’s and only $2 trillion behind that of our country. Josef Joffe,
The Sick Man of Europe is Europe, WALL STREET J. (May 27, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/the-sick-man-of-europe-is-europe-11558989783 [https://perma
.cc/3655-68TB]. As one international expert recently wrote, “[e]ver since World War
II, the liberal global order that has spread more freedom and prosperity around the
world than at any other time in history has been held up by two pillars: the United
States of America and the United Nations of Europe, now known as the European
Union.” Thomas L. Friedman, The End of Europe?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/opinion/europe-france-economy.html [https://per
ma.cc/22S2-7VAS]. Despite such success, Friedman is now concerned that the imminent exit of Great Britain from the Union as well as political turmoil in France may be
jeopardizing all that progress. This ideal of European unity, however, remains difficult
to achieve due to the innate nationalism of many of its member states. In that regard,
this recent reference to the European Parliament indicates the lack of commitment
that citizens of the continent feel toward that assembly. “[I]t is rare to hear Europeans
express any measure of reverence toward the body; its name is evoked more often in
the matters of regulating light bulbs and Roquefort cheese.” Elisabeth Zerofsky, The
Illiberal State: Viktor Orban’s Vision for Europe, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14, 2019), https:/
/www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/14/viktor-orbans-far-right-vision-for-europe
[https://perma.cc/Z9YK-V3CB]. Another commentator saw the EU’s parliamentary
elections in May 2019 as further evidence of this fragmentation where “the Europe
bashers and nationalists” scored big victories. Joffe, supra note 3. The Trump administration’s disregard of the value of international institutions may also be undermining
the future of the EU. See Steven Erlanger, U.S. Downgraded E.U.’s Diplomatic Status
(but Didn’t Say Anything), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
01/08/world/europe/eu-us-diplomatic-status.html [https://perma.cc/8W8B-MVTT].
4. In that regard, Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission,
recently stated the EU’s aspirations for “a Europe that protects . . . defends . . . [and]
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edged a deficiency in the legal systems of its member states when it
comes to allowing collective actions for victims of various types of economic harm. To address that, the EU is now developing guidelines
for such procedures that can redress those injuries.5
In the area of securities fraud, establishing such measures has taken
on more importance after both a spate of financial frauds by European companies6 and a significant decision from the United States Supreme Court, Morrison v. National Australia Bank.7 That ruling cut
back on the jurisdiction of American courts to adjudicate these claims
against foreign defendants—even when a significant amount of the
wrongdoing has occurred in the U.S.8
This EU initiative to develop a collective jurisprudence to redress
securities fraud also supports another goal that would foster European
economic well-being. It would promote a shift in the financing of businesses there from debt to equity. That would particularly help smalland medium-size firms by giving confidence to investors in those enterprises that if they were cheated they would have an effective means
to remedy that wrong.
As it is now, such stock frauds can typically involve a large number
of investors, many of whom have relatively small holdings. Individual
actions in those situations are not only too expensive to maintain but
are often inadequate to compensate all their victims and deter future
misconduct. The availability of effective collective remedies would
help Europeans overcome their reluctance to make equity investments and therefore provide more flexible capital structures to
businesses.9
The European Commission10 (“Commission”) is therefore trying to
fashion legal tools to address that problem. This involves enhancement of the EU’s mechanisms for stockholder litigation—what one
commentator defines as “an umbrella term for various forms of suit

can deliver for its citizens when and where it matters.” European Commission
Speech/17/3165, President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017
(Sept. 13, 2017).
5. See infra Section IV.A.–IV.B.
6. See generally Stefano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe:
U.S. Style Securities Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POL. 281, 282 (2006).
7. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
8. Id.; see also discussion infra Section III.
9. See infra Section I.A–B.
10. “The European Commission is the EU’s politically independent executive
arm. It is alone responsible for drawing up proposals for new European legislation,
and it implements the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of the
EU.” EUROPEAN UNION, European Commission, https://europa.eu/european-union/
about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission_en (last visited June 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/Z63E-WXSM].
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and a range of claims brought by shareholders against the company in
which they hold shares or against its directors and officers.”11
The EU’s proposals in that regard seek to encourage what it calls
“collective actions,”—its analog to U.S. class actions12—where many
stockholders with small claims can join together and adjudicate them
in one suit. Without such a corrective mechanism, the costs of litigation would be too great for those individuals, and they would not be
able to counter the substantial resources that the defendants typically
have.13
The EU’s proposals, however, lack features that have made American class actions so effective. The Commission is reluctant to embrace
that model because of what it calls our “abusive practices.” Chief
among them are contingent fees that compensate lawyers who represent shareholders harmed by these frauds.
In addition, the Europeans appear determined to hold on to several
rules that discourage lawyers from taking these cases.14 One is “loser
pay,” which makes those who are unsuccessful in litigation liable for
the legal fees of their counterparties who prevail. The potential of that
heavy extra charge is a disincentive for lawyers who would take these
cases. Another is that only plaintiffs who directly consent to be parties
can be part of these actions (opt-in), as opposed to the more generous
opt-out practice which includes all victims of the common fraud as
plaintiffs unless they specifically choose not to participate.15
This Article will therefore offer comment on those deficiencies in
the developing European model and encourage our friends across the
Atlantic to take a more realistic approach to their reforms. The American experience with securities class actions certainly has its detractors
and may have had some failings which have now been corrected. All
and all, however, the U.S. approach has served our economy well by
protecting investors, checking corporate wrongdoing, and affording
compensation to defrauded investors.
First, this Article will give a brief overview of the historic problems
that European companies have had with an over-reliance on debt financing. It will then discuss how reforms like better redress for fraud
can change that by giving equity investors a stronger belief that they
will get a fair shake. The EU’s proposals are a step in the right direction to address that concern, and the Article will go on to describe the
current state of their development. After that, it will use an American
11. Matteo Gargantini & Verity Winship, Private Ordering of Shareholder Litigation in the EU and the US, in THE ELGAR HANDBOOK FOR REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (Sean Griffith et al. eds., 2018).
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
13. See infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Sections IV.B. & V.C.
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perspective to point out their shortcomings with the goal of highlighting the benefits of the U.S. model to European policymakers.
II. THE BENEFITS

OF

EQUITY FINANCING

There are two sources of capital that businesses use to fund their
enterprises: equity and debt. The former represents money from their
owners16 while the latter are fixed obligations. Those typically require
that a company make payments of principal and interest to its
lender.17 Debt financing also has the advantage of being tax deductible,18 and it allows a firm to leverage its operations, providing greater
return to its owners when its profits exceed those required
disbursements.19
Yet equity financing has several important advantages over debt. Its
investors look to the company’s success for profit rather than being
guaranteed a fixed return regardless of the company’s fortunes. It is
therefore permanently committed to the business, affording its managers more flexibility.20 Along those lines, debt financing often comes
with restrictions on a company’s operations that may prevent it from
pursuing new opportunities outside its core business.21 Because equity
does not have to be repaid, it also allows a firm to have more capital
available.
Equity funding is therefore particularly attractive for start-ups and
small firms. Required debt payments may put unneeded pressure on
them when they are having cash-flow problems. These companies are
also more susceptible to distress and ultimate failure than well-established enterprises.22 They will often find it harder to get bank financing than larger or more diversified businesses where creditors can be
more secure in getting repayment of the money they have advanced.
In addition, small companies typically have much less information
available about their operations than large, publicly held ones, making
banks and other lenders leery to finance them.23
16. See John C. Groth, Capital Structure: Perspectives, in QFINANCE: THE ULTIRESOURCE 24–27 (4th ed. 2013).
17. JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 243
(13th ed. 2017).
18. Id. at 247–49.
19. Id. at 244–47.
20. RONALD W. MELICHER & EDGAR A. NORTON, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCE
15 (16th ed. 2017).
21. J.B. Maverick, What Are the Benefits for a Company Using Equity Financing v.
Debt Financing?, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/
answers/042215/what-are-benefits-company-using-equity-financing-vs-debt-financing
.asp (last updated April 19, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2M4K-LWDJ].
22. Susan Coleman et al., The Debt-Equity Decisions of U.S. Startup Firms, 40 J.
ECON. FINANCE 105, 107 (2016).
23. Id. at 107–08.
MATE
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Equity is also a good investment because those who purchase shares
are getting a stake in the long-term profitability of their companies.24
Studies show that stocks provide much better long-term returns than
bonds, and share ownership is therefore a better way for savers to
build their wealth.25
A. The EU’s Need for More Equity Financing
Despite these benefits of equity financing, European firms have historically relied heavily on capital raised from bondholders and other
creditors.26 While this situation has improved somewhat for companies with large capitalizations and those who rely on institutional investors, it remains a problem for small- and medium-size firms.27 As
one commentator put it succinctly, “The retail markets for securities
among the EU member states are relatively underdeveloped compared to U.S. securities markets, particularly in terms of substantive
participation by individual investors.”28
24. MACEY, supra note 17, at 275. Equity, i.e., common stock, represents the
owner’s capital, thus shareholders are said to be the residual claimants of
corporations.
25. Bradford DeLong & Konstantin Magin, The U.S. Equity Return Premium:
Past, Present, and Future, 23 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 193–94 (2009); Thomas
E. MaCurdy & John B. Shoven, Stocks, Bonds, and Pension Wealth, in TOPICS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF AGING 61, 61–78 (University of Chicago ed., 1992). Along those lines,
growing inequality in income and wealth in the United States is in large part due to
the fact that the richest Americans now own the lion’s share of all stocks. Unfortunately, the rising equity market in the last decade has thus not benefitted most of our
citizens. Rob Wile, The Richest 10% of Americans Now Own 84% of All Stocks,
MONEY (Dec. 19, 2017), http://money.com/money/5054009/stock-ownership-10-percent-richest/ [https://perma.cc/Q6WB-KHV6]; Christopher Ingraham, For Roughly
Half of Americans, the Stock Market’s Record Highs Don’t Help at All, WASHINGTON
POST (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/18/forroughly-half-of-americans-the-stock-markets-record-highs-dont-help-at-all/?utm_
term=.18eb1aba2114 [https://perma.cc/8HRH-6EBA]. In addition, the diminishing
number of such investment opportunities may be compounding that problem. U.S.
companies whose shares are listed on exchanges have decreased from over 7,000 in
the late 1990s to roughly 3,600 today. Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/04/22/why-the-decline-in-the-number-of-listed-american-firms-matters
[https://perma.cc/6CR9-DRAG]. And to make matters worse for ordinary investors,
some “private firms” worth more than one billion dollars (known colloquially as “unicorns”) have not made their stock available to the public. However, that may be
changing. In 2018, thirty-eight of those billion-dollar companies went public. Corrine
Driebusch, Tech Unicorns are Going Public at a Near Record Pace, WALL STREET J.
(Dec. 18, 2018, 5:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-unicorns-are-going-publicat-near-record-pace-11545138000 [https://perma.cc/EW6N-AM62].
26. See Manfred Schepers, EU Needs More Equity Finance, Less Debt, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/dc73228a-b1e8-11e4-b380-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cc/7SWS-9YCN].
27. Id.
28. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Action: An Unlikely Export to the European Union, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1075 (2012).
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The EU economy is roughly the same size as America’s, but its equity markets are just half as big.29 And in many European countries
the number of shareholders is going down,30 perhaps owing at least in
part to financial crises during the last several decades.31 Those may
have led Europeans to believe that putting their savings in stock is too
risky.32
While many small- and medium-size businesses in Europe therefore
struggle to raise capital, their counterparts in the United States thrive.
They employ about 50% of our workforce and largely drive American
advancement and international trade. To that end, small firms employ
43% of our high-tech workers and supply about one-third of our
exports.33
By and large, those businesses prefer equity financing. Perhaps that
is because banks may see them as too risky and opaque for loans, but
it is also because of the flexibility they afford their founders, particularly those whose companies are start-ups.34 Rapid economic growth
is therefore more likely to occur in countries with an active stock market. As a leading textbook puts it, “[I]t may not be coincidental that
Silicon Valley developed in the United States, not in Germany or
Japan.”35
The situation in Europe is thus not promising for small- and medium-size businesses that could be the engines of innovation that the
EU needs.36 That may very well be owing to the lack of confidence
that EU investors have that they will be treated fairly if they purchase
stock in those firms.37 It may also be because trading markets for equity capital there are more fragmented and less developed than in the
U.S. There are still more than twenty individual stock exchanges in
European countries.38
As the Commission seeks to remedy that by promoting more integration of the economies of its member states, it is also taking steps to
encourage more non-banking financial institutions such as those that
29. Visco, supra note 3, at 3.
30. OBSERVATOIRE DE L’EPARGNE EUROPEENE-OEE, UNDER THE TENDER:
WHO OWNS THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY? EVOLUTION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF EULISTED COMPANIES BETWEEN 1970 AND 2012 9 (2013).
31. Grace, supra note 6, at 282, 298.
32. OBSERVATOIRE DE L’EPARGNE EUROPEENE-OEE, supra note 30, at 9.
33. Coleman et al., supra note 22, at 106.
34. Id.
35. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 8 (12th
ed. 2012). For a fine discussion of this phenomenon, including the role that venture
capital and equity financing played in the development of the high-tech industry in
the United States, see generally MARGARET O’MARA, THE CODE: SILICON VALLEY
AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICA (2019).
36. Schepers, supra note 26.
37. See infra Section II.B.
38. Schepers, supra note 26.
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would underwrite the issuance of stock.39 Those would help place equity in firms which focus on innovative projects that are riskier than
those of established companies.40
At present, however, private equity funding does not flow to those
companies because trading markets for their shares are too illiquid.41
And while the end-game of an IPO42 provides a real incentive in the
U.S. for smaller firms to access capital and convert the wealth that its
founders and early investors have created into cash,43 that attractive
exit strategy is a lot less available in the EU.44
European advocates for more equity funding also point to the difficulties their countries face during recessions when bank lending becomes problematic. Shareholder capital would provide more
flexibility and resistance to such economic downturns.45 They also
note that the ability to buy shares of companies gives investors more
opportunities to increase their wealth.46 Such an improved financial
system, they say, has been a long-standing goal of the EU ever since
its inception in the Treaty of Rome.47 It will promote economic
growth48 and job creation by encouraging entrepreneurship and allocating capital to its most productive uses.49
B. The Importance of Investor Confidence
Purchasers of securities have a special need to believe that those
who seek their funds will not cheat them. U.S. securities regulation is
premised on that, concentrating on financial markets “that allocate
capital, moving it from savers through financial intermediaries (e.g.,
underwriters, dealers, and other financial firms) to users (i.e., those
39. Visco, supra note 3, at 4.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Schepers, supra note 26.
42. See James Chen, Initial Public Offering – IPO, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp (last visited Jun. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UDS8T8VN]. The process of offering shares of a private corporation to the public for the
first time is called an initial public offering (“IPO”). Growing companies that need
capital will frequently use IPOs to raise money. Other more established firms may use
an IPO to allow the inside shareholders to exit some or all their ownership by selling
shares to the public. In an initial public offering, the issuer, or company raising capital, brings in underwriting firms or investment banks to help determine “the best type
of security to issue, offering price, amount of shares and time frame for the market
offering.” Id.
43. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 249–50 (7th ed. 2017).
44. See Justina Lee & Swetha Gopinath, Europe IPOs at Lowest Since Crisis Fuel
Shrinking Market Fears, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2019, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2019-08-19/stock-market-shrinkage-exacerbated-by-europeipos-at-decade-low [https://perma.cc/MU88-TM98].
45. Visco, supra note 3, at 3.
46. Id. See also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. Visco, supra note 3, at 9.
48. Schepers, supra note 26.
49. Visco, supra note 3, at 9.
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who have productive uses for capital and are willing to pay a competitive return).”50 That process is unlike investment in other goods: “Not
only is it impossible for the typical buyer [of stock] to examine the
company, but the value of the security depends heavily on the likely
future earnings of the issuing corporation (or other entity).”51
Because of those complexities, securities have been called “intricate
merchandise” and are heavily regulated in the United States.52 Those
laws include liberal provisions for defrauded investors to sue those
who have swindled them.53 These legal protections are designed to
support the confidence that is necessary if individuals and groups are
to commit their financial resources to businesses with the hope of
sharing in their profits.
As a recent report from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) put it: “Several research studies have found that greater trust
both at the individual and national levels is related to higher levels of
investment and participation in the stock market.”54 It also noted that
investors’ confidence was degraded when they feared “possible expropriations by other market participants” because of fraud, theft, or
other abuses. In addition, it found that “revelation[s] of corporate
fraud in a US state decrease[ ] investment in the stock market by residents of that state.”55 Professor Lynn Stout succinctly stated the reasons for that with these comments:
Without investor trust, our market would be a thin shadow of its
present self. Suspicious and distrustful investors would refuse to exchange their hard-earned cash for such abstract and intangible
goods as corporate securities. Instead, they would put their savings
into tangible assets like gold or real estate, or under their
mattresses.56

Professor Stout went on to note the great benefits our country enjoys from having such a “trusting investor who has made it possible
for the United States to develop a multi-trillion dollar public securities
market in which corporations can annually raise hundreds of billions
of dollars of new capital.”57 She then asked this rhetorical question
about the reasons for that confidence which American investors have:
“Why don’t they believe, instead, that if they purchase corporate securities their money will be stolen or squandered by unscrupulous
50. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 35, at 1.
51. Id. at 5.
52. SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc.
No. 88-95, pt. 4 at 694 (1963).
53. See generally, MARC I. STEINBERG ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION (2016).
54. K. JEREMY KO, Economic Note: Investor Confidence, Securities and Exchange
Commission, October 2017.
55. Id.
56. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 407, 408
(2002).
57. Id. at 430.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-1\TWL102.txt

134

unknown

Seq: 10

25-OCT-19

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

11:28

[Vol. 7

corporate directors, larcenous executives, and dishonest brokers, investment advisors and mutual fund managers?”58 Professor Stout in
turn answered that with this direct response: “And one of the first
things the trusting investor needs, quite bluntly, is at least some degree of government-imposed investor protection.”59 Robust remedies
for defrauded investors are a big part of that legal regime. With such
remedies lacking in the EU, however, corporate scandals have weakened investor confidence there.60 The predicable result has been a
continuing decline in the willingness of Europeans to buy stock.61
III.

THE IMPACT

OF THE

MORRISON DECISION

Another factor contributing to the EU’s more receptive approach
to securities class actions may be the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.62 Commentators have called
it “part of a significant sea change in the globalization of securities
fraud litigation.”63 The case deals with the extraterritorial reach of
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),
a leading provision of U.S. federal law used by shareholders to recover for securities fraud.64
A. Pre-Morrison Litigation
Until Morrison was decided in 2010, the global jurisdiction of
American courts in this area was fairly broad. Lower courts had entertained such actions brought by foreign plaintiffs when a large amount
of the alleged wrongdoing occurred in the United States.65 Citing the
common American practices of allowing lawyers to be compensated
by contingent fees and not requiring losing parties to pay the legal
expenses of the winners, the English peer Lord Alfred Thompson
Denning said, “As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn
to the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 430.
Grace, supra note 6, at 290–91.
OBSERVATOIRE DE L’EPARGNE EUROPEENE-OEE, supra note 30, at 9.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
DAVID H. KISTENBROKER ET AL., DEVELOPMENTS IN GLOBAL SECURITIES
LITIGATION 4 (Dechert, LLP, ed., Nov. 2017).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240. Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security. Courts have implied a private right of action under it. See Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). For a discussion of the jurisprudence of 10b-5 by myself, see Daniel J. Morrissey, Guardians of the Galaxy, How
Shareholder Lawyers Won Big and Vindicated the Integrity of our Economy, 51 LOY.
OF L.A. L. REV. 199 (2019).
65. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
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stands to win a fortune, at no risk to himself, and at no risk of having
to pay anything to the other side.”66
B. The Morrison Case
All that changed with Morrison. Like earlier cases in which American courts had exercised jurisdiction, a substantial part of the fraud
happened in the United States.67 A Florida subsidiary of the defendant, a major Australian Bank, was in the business of servicing home
mortgages.68 The value of those operations, however, would diminish
if the mortgages were paid back before they came due.69 The plaintiffs
charged that some of the company’s top officials manipulated its financial models to hide that its rates of such early repayments were
unrealistically low. That materially inflated the firm’s financial
statements.70
The action of those officials took place in Florida, and when the
truth came out about their corrupt practices, the worth of the bank’s
shares dropped.71 Australians who held that stock sued in the U.S.,
but the Supreme Court overturned existing precedent and dismissed
the shareholders’ action on several grounds. First, it found no warrant
in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to counter what it said was the
normal presumption against the extraterritorial scope of federal
causes of action. The Court then parsed that statute and cited its language requiring a fraud to be “in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.”72 That meant, the Court said, that it covered
only domestic transactions. Since the Australian plaintiffs did not buy
their shares in the U.S., they lacked standing for their suit.
In addition, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that such U.S.
actions would be incompatible with the laws of other countries where
foreign plaintiffs and foreign companies were residents. It noted that
the regulations of those other nations covering these situations might
differ in many ways from American laws. It would be inappropriate
therefore for our country to interfere in their legal systems if the
purchases or sales were made outside the United States or involved a
security not listed on a domestic exchange.
Justice Scalia, who wrote the Court’s opinion, could also not resist
taking a swipe at American attorneys who bring those suits. He turned
aside an argument that the Court’s holding would make the United
66. BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, 67–68 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Press 1990).
67. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
68. Id. at 251.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 252.
71. Id.
72. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
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States a “Barbary Coast” for those perpetrating such frauds with this
retort: “[S]ome fear that it has become the Shangri-La of class-action
litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign
securities markets.”73
C. Post-Morrison Opinions
After the Morrison decision, lower courts in the U.S. took their cue
and barred foreign plaintiffs from seeking redress for securities fraud.
That occurred even when shares of foreign corporations were crosslisted on an American exchange if their purchase or sale took place
outside the country.74
U.S. lower courts, however, have reached conflicting results in situations where American Depositary Shares (“ADRs”) of the defendant companies were listed on an American exchange. Those give
their owners the right to purchase the firm’s ordinary (i.e., common)
shares. Even though such ADRs were publicly sold in the U.S. and
registered with the SEC, one court,75 citing the spirit of Morrison,
barred the plaintiffs from bringing a 10b-5 claim in its forum. It did so
because the ultimate acquisitions of that stock would take place in a
foreign country.
But another court found that when the ADRs of a foreign company
were trading over-the-counter in the U.S., it could have jurisdiction
over a 10b-5 claim. It held that ADRs were securities and when the
parties to such a transaction incur “irrevocable liability” in the U.S., it
would entertain such an action.76
In yet another situation where ADRs traded on an American exchange were sponsored by the foreign defendant, the court held that it
had to scrutinize the individual nature of the transactions to see if they
could be deemed “domestic” under Morrison. Such a particularized
determination involving who sold the securities and what documentation was required had to take place, the court said, before it could
certify a class as having common questions.77
73. Id. at 270.
74. City of Pontiac Police & Fireman Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173 (2d Cir.
2014).
75. In re Vivendi, SA Securities Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2016).
76. Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F. 3d 933, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Choi v.
Tower Research Capital, LLC, 890 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2018) where the court upheld
allegations that a New York based high frequency trading firm violated the anti-fraud
provision of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. by manipulating transactions involving orders for futures contracts placed on a Korean exchange which
were matched with an electronic trading platform in Illinois. The Court indicated that
Morrison would not preclude it from taking jurisdiction over that case. Choi, 890 F.3d
at 67.
77. In re Petrobras, 862 F.3d 250, 253–54 (2d Cir. 2017).
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D. Morrison’s Effect on Global Securities Litigation
Despite the efforts of shareholder lawyers to keep their suits in
American courts, it is apparent that such actions face a substantial
barrier after Morrison—what one commentator called a “devastating
blow to plaintiffs’ securities counsel filing class actions in U.S. courts
against foreign companies.”78 It effectively foreclosed claims in the
U.S. against foreign issuers whose shares are not traded here. Commentators have referred to these cases as “F-cubed” (foreign investors, suing a foreign issuer, traded on foreign exchanges).79
The focus has thus shifted to other jurisdictions which might provide more promising fora for securities class actions. Those suits have
been called “the world’s most economically significant form of litigation,”80 and one that “strikes fear in the hearts of executives of publicly-held companies[.]”81 In that regard, two distinguished
commentators stated that: “As shareholder litigation expands globally
and increases in economic significance, so does the interest of parties
in fighting over the rules that govern it and determine its scope.”82
Until now, when its courts were open to these F-Cubed suits, the
United States “stood virtually alone in its commitment to ordinary
civil litigation as an instrument of economic regulation.”83 For instance, just several decades ago, European countries had nothing resembling American securities class actions.84 But in the wake of
Morrison, things may be changing.
The Netherlands, with its Collective Settlement Act, has come on
strong in the post-Morrison era as perhaps the most promising home
for such global actions.85 Among the attractive features of that law is
an opt-out provision that automatically joins all similarly situated
claimants, even non-Dutch ones, unless they specifically elect not to
78. Warren, supra note 28, at 1080.
79. DAVID KISTENBROKER, ET AL., A NEW ERA IN GLOBAL SECURITIES LITIGATION: PART 1, 3 (Dechert, ed., 2018).
80. William Savitt, Preface to THE SECURITIES LITIGATION REVIEW, v. (William
Savitt, ed., 2017).
81. Warren, supra note 28, at 1080. As a well-respected authority noted,
“[c]orporate counsel tend to perceive . . . securities class actions as a threat.” John C.
Coffee, Jr., “Loser Pays”: The Latest Installment in the Battle-Scarred, Cliff-Hanging
Survival of the Rule 10b-5 Class Action, 68 SMU L. REV. 689, 695 (2015).
82. Gargantini & Winship, supra note 11, at 439.
83. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Class Actions, Conflict and the Global Economy, 21 IND.
J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 585, 586 (2014).
84. Stefann Voet, The Crux of the Matter: Funding and Financing Collective Redress Mechanisms, in EU CIVIL JUSTICE: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 1
(Burkhard Hess et al. eds., 1st ed. 2015). As one observer noted, the European legal
systems have “historically not permitted . . . class actions for monetary damages on
the U.S. model: that is, true representative litigation in which one plaintiff can act for,
and bind the rest of the class members.” Buxbaum, supra note 83, at 586.
85. See generally, Xandra E. Kramer, Securities Collective Action and Private International Law Issues in Dutch WCAM Settlements: Global Aspirations and Regional
Boundaries, 27 GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 235 (2014).
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participate.86 It also includes liberal settlement mechanisms where
courts are actively involved.87
These Dutch actions may be maintained by representative groups,
which are loosely defined and need not be non-profits. In addition,
something akin to contingent awards called “success fees” can be
made to prevailing lawyers.88 Yet collective actions in the Netherlands
may only ask for declaratory or injunctive relief. Individuals seeking
money damages must press their own claims and establish causation.
Even there, though, those have furnished some plaintiffs with ample
recoveries.89
Next door to the U.S., the Canadian province of Ontario also appears to have become receptive to suits for shareholders aggrieved by
financial misrepresentations because a decision there allowed international plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction.90 Down under, Australia has
also become a player in world-wide securities litigation by, among
other things, showing a more favorable attitude toward external funding of these suits.91 In the United Kingdom as well, collective actions
which in former times were rarely used, are now more in vogue, perhaps because of a recent tendency to allow third parties to fund
them.92
IV. EU PROPOSALS
The thrust of this Article, however, will be on specific initiatives
recently undertaken by the European Union to encourage its member
states to adopt collective redress mechanisms for securities fraud. Citing a number of scandals and abuses that have caused large scale injuries to its citizens, the Commission recently noted that they have
“shed light on the debate regarding whether collective redress mechanisms were missing at the European Union level.”93 The Commission
went on to state that those wrongs pose an issue of “effective and
timely access to justice for all citizens.” It also called that “a particularly pressing question in a context of . . . increased risks of crossborder mass harm situations due to greater interconnected
economies.”94
86. KISTENBROKER ET AL., supra note 63, at 13.
87. Kramer, supra note 85, at 240.
88. KISTENBROKER ET AL., supra note 63, at 11.
89. Id. at 12–15.
90. Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of a New Battleground: Liability for Secondary Market Violations in Ontario, 48 INT’L L. 17, 17 (2014).
91. STEINBERG, supra note 53, at 942–43.
92. KISTENBROKER ET AL., supra note 63, at 15.
93. DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, POLICY DEPARTMENT FOR
CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, Collective Redress in the Member
States of the European Union at 8, Sept. 2018, https://www.transeuropexperts.eu/docu
ments/Study%20-%20Collective-redress-.pdf [https://perma.cc/72ED-B4DN].
94. Id.
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Part of the challenge for the EU is increasing access to justice for
investors injured by wrongful financial practices. As two observers
pointed out, individual Europeans have faced substantial difficulties
seeking redress there. Chief among them have been the high cost and
lengthy nature of proceedings to adjudicate those claims. In addition,
these plaintiffs usually have relatively small losses and encounter stiff
resistance from powerful defendants who have significant advantages
over them because of the information they possess.95
There had to be a way to address situations when a large number of
people were hurt by the same illegal practice and needed a remedy
where they could aggregate their claims and together seek damages.96
Momentum kept building for legal vehicles to effectively redress those
wrongs.
A. Early Actions
The first initiative came in 2005 when the Commission issued a
Green Paper97 on antitrust damage actions. It continued in 2008 when
the same group came out with a White Paper that included suggestions for specific collective redress. In the same year, the Commission
also published another Green Paper with proposals for joint consumer
redress, and in 2011, the Commission held a public consultation on
that subject with the title “Towards a More Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress.”98
All that led to a resolution from the European Parliament in February 2012 adopting the consultation’s stated goal and calling for a coherent effort to fashion a common set of principles for collective
redress. Those principles would specifically, but not exclusively, cover
infringement of consumer rights. While the resolution spoke of respecting the legal traditions of individual member states, its clear aim
95. Verica Trstenjak & Petra Weingerl, Collective Actions in the European Union,
American or European Model, 5 BEIJING L. REV. 155, 156 (2014).
96. Commission Recommendation on Common Principles for Injunctive and
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (L 201) (60) [hereinafter 2013
Recommendations].
97. A green paper is a “first-draft document on a specific policy area circulated
among interested parties who are invited to join in a process of consultation and debate. The objective of a green paper is to arrive at a general consensus before drafting
the official policy document, the white paper.” Green Paper, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://
www.businessdictionary.com/definition/green-paper.html [https://perma.cc/7D4BVWVF].
98. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96, at 60(3). For a comment on these initiatives from an American perspective, see Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, Will
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009). There the authors argued the previous European attitude toward class actions was the result of its
view on the “perversity of rapacious Americans.” Id. at 179.
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was to enhance the coordination of their efforts to create a common
mechanism for such group action.99
With all those papers and resolutions, the Commission was now acknowledging that it needed some rules, or at least guiding principles,
that would, in the words of one commentator, “harmoniz[e] [a] pattern for group actions.”100 She also observed that this new initiative
would have to be flexible enough to go beyond anti-trust and consumer litigation.101 Yet the only certainty in that undertaking was that
the Commission would follow its own way and not go with the American model, which it said was “not only at odds with European legal
traditions, but also a ‘toxic cocktail’ that could open the door to abusive litigation.”102
B. The 2013 Recommendations
All those efforts came to a head in 2013 when the Commission issued its Recommendations “on common principles for injunctive and
compensatory collective redress mechanisms.”103 There it presented
its initiative that would allow private persons to pursue their claims as
a group for violations of certain rights. Among other wrongful conduct that could be redressed, it would authorize individuals to bring
suits to supplement public enforcement of financial service legislation
and laws geared to investor protection.104 The Commission’s recommendations were supposed to set “minimum standards” that its member states would adopt to make sure those actions were “fair,
equitable, timely, and not prohibitively expensive.”105 The two vehicles for this collective redress were to be group litigation and representative action.
In the former, individuals who have suffered similar harm could join
together to bring an action and manage it to recover their losses.106 In
the latter, a representative could litigate on behalf of common claimants.107 These would be “limited to ad hoc certified entities, designated representative entities that fulfill certain criteria set by law or to
public authorities”108 and there was a clear preference that those entities would be non-profits.109
99. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96, at 60(4).
100. Elizabeth Silvestri, Towards a Common Framework of Collective Redress in
Europe? An Update on the Latest Initiatives of the European Commission, 1 RUSSIAN
L. J. 45, 48 (2013).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Commission Green Paper on Collective Redress, at 3, COM (2008)
794 final (Nov. 27, 2008)).
103. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96.
104. Id. at 60(7).
105. Silvestri, supra note 100, at 49.
106. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96, at 61(17).
107. Trstenjak & Weingerl, supra note 95, at 160.
108. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96, at 61(18).
109. Silvestri, supra note 100, at 50; Trstenjak & Weingerl, supra note 95, at 160.
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In addition, the representatives would have to show that they had
the “administrative and financial capacity” to maintain the suits in the
best interest of the group members.110 Accordingly, they would need
to have not only the necessary economic resources to fund such an
endeavor, but also the human and legal expertise to adequately represent the injured plaintiffs.111
It was also important for the Commission that all potential group
members be furnished adequate information about the proceedings—
both before they begin and during their prosecution.112 That went
hand in hand with one of the more questionable recommendations of
the Commission—that all group members make a decision to join the
litigation. This “opt-in” requirement contrasts with the American
practice (and that adopted by the Netherlands)113 that members of a
class must affirmatively signal that they do not want to be part of it,
i.e., opt-out, or else they will be bound by its result.114
The Commission also made dubious suggestions on how such litigation would be funded. Adequate resources, or the lack thereof, can
“make or break” these actions.115 Departing again from the U.S.
model, the Commission stated a distaste for contingent fees—the arrangement where the lawyer for the class finances the litigation and is
compensated by a percentage of the recovery.116 In its place, the Recommendations indicated that these actions could be financed by the
parties or entities bringing the suits.
The Recommendations suggested that if those plaintiffs were foundations or representative associations, they might have sufficient resources to undertake them.117 Funding, the Commission said, might
also come from public sources or legal aid associations.118 Yet as one
observer commented, that is unlikely today when government expenditures are under severe pressure.119 And if the alternative is that all
costs and legal expenses have to come out of the pockets of the claimants, it would be a substantial hindrance to these actions, especially if
they have relatively small amounts at stake.120
110. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96, at 61(18).
111. Silvestri, supra note 100, at 50; Trstenjak & Weingerl, supra note 95, at 160.
112. Silvestri, supra note 100, at 50.
113. See Kramer, supra note 85, at 239–40.
114. See Silvestri, supra note 100, at 50, 52.
115. See Voet, supra note 84, at 222.
116. See Trstenjak & Weingerl, supra note 95, at 161.
117. See Voet, supra note 84, at 208.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 215. As that author also noted, with such limited public resources, government authorities would become “gatekeepers,” funding only actions that they
deemed meritorious. Id. at 208–09. Or worse, they might act for “political imperatives
or the interests of particular stakeholder groups, which could raise concerns regarding
access to justice.” Id. at 208.
120. Id. at 206–07.
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The Commission also expressed its preference for the traditional
European “loser pay” rule where, unlike the American model, the
party that does not prevail must pay the legal fees and expenses of the
winning side.121 That, of course, would serve as an additional deterrent to this litigation. Plaintiffs would have to think long and hard
about their chances of being successful because if they were not, they
would not only have to bear their own costs and expenses but those of
the defendants as well.
In addition to those initiatives, the Recommendations stated that
courts should be given a key role in overseeing and managing these
suits.122 Among other things, the Recommendations would require
that any ex-ante financing arrangements be fully disclosed to the court
at the onset of the litigation.123 The Recommendations also looked
favorably on the possibility that alternative methods of dispute resolution might afford a quicker and cheaper means of resolving these
claims than litigation.124
On that point, one commentator noted that the Commission had
“great expectations” for that process.125 She questioned, however, if it
would be mandatory and whether there would be adequate judicial
safeguards to make sure the claimants got a fair shake.126 In the
United States, such proposals to settle securities fraud claims by arbitration have been quite controversial since it appears they would preclude class actions and thus be unaffordable to small claimants.127
C. Unsatisfactory Follow-Up
In January 2018, the Commission issued a follow-up report on the
progress its member states had made in implementing its 2013 Recommendations.128 The results, it found, had been uneven and for the
most part unsatisfactory.129 Nine of them still had no provisions to
adjudicate collective compensation claims along the lines envisioned
in the Commission’s 2013 Recommendations.130
In the countries that had taken action, the implementation of the
Commission’s recommendations was spotty. Even in the nations that
did have some of those mechanisms, they were not working out in
practice due to lengthy procedures or high costs that discouraged their
121. Id. at 205.
122. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96, at (21).
123. See Voet, supra note 84, at 206.
124. 2013 Recommendations, supra note 96, at (16).
125. Id.
126. See Silvestri, supra note 100, at 53–54.
127. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
128. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee, COM (2018) 40 final (Jan. 25, 2018).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 3.

R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-1\TWL102.txt

unknown

Seq: 19

25-OCT-19

2019] COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR SECURITIES FRAUD

11:28

143

use.131 Nineteen member states did allow aggregate compensatory relief, but that came mainly in consumer cases.132 New initiatives in collective action legislation seemed likewise restricted to those matters
where, contrary to the 2013 Recommendations, opt-out procedures
were being allowed.133
The Commission’s 2018 follow-up study also found that member
states were not heeding its recommendation which required that individual claimants be adequately informed about what was happening in
their collective actions.134 Even the “loser pay” principle that it was
urging was not uniformly being observed due to differences that countries had about what costs winning parties could recover.135
On the matter of funding, the 2018 Report found that none of the
member states were putting into practice its recommendation that
third-party financing of these actions be strictly limited.136 Many were
allowing unwarranted incentives to bring these suits.137 In much the
same vein, the report lamented that its suggested prohibition on contingent fees was not being followed. At least nine countries were permitting some form of them.138
Europe, it seemed, was still a long way from creating a single approach that groups of individuals who had been similarly harmed
could use to facilitate access to justice. The Commission concluded its
2018 Report by reasserting its commitment to making collective actions available.139 To that end, the Commission said it would continue
to analyze its recommendations, such as those involving funding, to
better understand their practicality.140
Just several months later, in April 2018, the Commission made good
on that commitment by publishing a proposal for collective lawsuit
legislation in the consumer area that would apply to all its member
states.141 A year later, in April 2019, the European Parliament and the
European Council reached a provisional agreement to move for its

131. Id.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 2–3.
134. Id. at 7–8.
135. Id. at 8–9.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 9–10.
138. Id. at 16.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. A Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of Consumers, and
Repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, at 1, COM (2018) 184 final (Apr. 11, 2018).
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formal adoption.142 The legislation, while geared to “core consumer
protection areas,” could also encompass financial services.143
The proposal contemplates that these actions will be brought by
“qualifying entities”144—which as before seem to focus on non-profit
entities—but might include “ad hoc litigation vehicles.”145 There also
appear to be restrictions on third-party funding of those actions. Unlike earlier proposals, however, this one does not rule out what the
Commission previously viewed as “a safeguard against abuses of the
proposed EU collective action mechanism” such as the opt-in requirement, the loser pay principle, and the exclusion of punitive
damages.146
V. SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS—AMERICAN STYLE
While the Commission’s recent proposal shows some movement
forward for collective actions in the consumer area, its January 2018
follow-up report revealed the ample difficulties its member states are
having in facilitating securities class actions. Europe should therefore
take a second look at how those suits are maintained in our country.
One well-respected corporate scholar gave this apt description of the
virtues of the American experience:
When the single claimant could not proceed individually because
her expenses would dwarf the expected recover[y], the class action
can be brought on behalf of all who are similarly situated. And the
sheer size of the aggregated claim attracts not only the entrepreneurial instincts of the class [action] lawyer but also commands the full attention of the defendant. The class action thereby
has an important deterrent feature which give it a quasi-public character; it can thus be seen as an extension of the state’s enforcement
arm and an expression of society’s will.147
142. Press Release IP/19/1755, European Comm’n, New Deal for Consumers: European Commission Welcomes Provisional Agreement on Strengthening EU Consumer Protection Rules (Apr. 2, 2019).
143. The First EU-Wide Consumer Collective Action System Proposal – How Might
This Impact Financial Services Firms?, DENTONS (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.dentons
.com/en/insights/articles/2018/august/3/the-first-eu-wide-consumer-collective-actionsystem-proposal [https://perma.cc/7WPA-W7Q8].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1997). Another noted securities expert made much the same point
with these remarks: “Securities class actions have an appealing attraction to those
seeking to deter fraud. If a party commits fraud that affects hundreds, if not
thousands of dispersed shareholders, allowing a plaintiff’s attorney to aggregate the
claims into a single class action makes the pursuit of such claims both more manageable and economical.” Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1522 (2004).
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While the SEC has a mandate to enforce the federal securities laws
and pursue fraudsters, it can only prosecute a small fraction of those
harms. As a well-respected financial columnist put it: “It’s no secret
that the Securities and Exchange Commission is terrifically understaffed and wildly underfunded compared with the populous and wealthy
Wall Street world it is supposed to police.”148
Accordingly, both Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized how these suits supplement public enforcement of the securities
laws. As a committee from the House of Representatives stated:
Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely
upon government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and
global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs.149

The Supreme Court seconded those sentiments with these remarks:
“This Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions to
enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement
to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission.”150 In addition, the possibility of these lawsuits
encourages investors to enter the market knowing that they have a
legal means of recovery if they are defrauded.151
To be sure, U.S. securities class actions are not without their critiques. Using a well-worn shibboleth for these actions, “strike suits,”
now retired Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner described
these suits as being brought “for the sole purpose of obtaining fees
for the plaintiffs’ counsel.”152 To the contrary, however, many of
148. Gretchen Morgenson, Quick, Call Tech Support for the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/business/16gret.html [https://per
ma.cc/2TQS-TW2J].
149. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
150. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). In another opinion, the Court also had this to say about the importance of private antifraud actions: “[A] dynamic, free economy presupposes a high degree of integrity in
all of its parts, an integrity that must be underwritten by rules enforceable in fair,
independent, accessible courts.” Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 522 U.S. 148, 161 (2008).
151. Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection under the Securities Laws:
Good for the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347, 353–54 (2002). See also supra notes
50–61 and accompanying text.
152. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2016). Another example of this negative attitude is a report from the United States Chamber of
Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform, entitled The Growth of Collective Redress in
the EU, which surveyed the developments in various member states of the EU. See
U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE GROWTH OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EU (2017). Its position was quite critical of those actions as they exist in
the United States because they can lead to “litigation abuse . . . where the risks and

R

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-1\TWL102.txt

146

unknown

Seq: 22

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

25-OCT-19

11:28

[Vol. 7

these suits often result in substantial recoveries for defrauded shareholders.153
In addition, Congress remedied many of the perceived deficiencies
in these actions with amendments to the securities laws enacted in
1995 as the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).154
The PSLRA requires that securities fraud be plead with particularity.155 It also prohibits discovery156 until the plaintiff survives a motion
to dismiss and demonstrates in its pleading by a “strong inference”157
that the defendants acted with the requisite state of mind.158 In addition, to assure that the shareholder plaintiff effectively monitors the
suit,159 the court must appoint lead counsel to represent the client with
the most “skin in the game,” usually the stockholder with the greatest
alleged losses.160
A. The Importance of Contingent Fees
Securities class actions are complex legal proceedings. The lawyers
who bring them must be knowledgeable not only in the intricate laws
and policies governing financial instruments, but they must also be
skilled in pretrial and trial practice.161 Success in this litigation requires not just great legal expertise, but also strenuous and persistent
effort.162 Significant financial incentives are therefore needed to encourage lawyers to undertake these important actions. As one legal
scholar remarked: “It is often asserted that class action lawyers take
too much from settlements . . . [M]uch of this criticism . . . is misrewards are out of balance, meaning that significant financial incentives exist to file
weak (or even entirely meritless) claims.” Id. at 1.
153. See Morrissey, supra note 64, at 199, for my article describing one such action
that resulted in a $1.5 billion settlement and returned a large percent of the shareholders’ losses to them.
154. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (amending the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act by adding new sections 27A and 21D, respectively).
155. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1995).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3).
157. Id. § (b)(2); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
314 (2007).
158. The Supreme Court has held that in actions under Rule 10b-5, defendants
must have acted with scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
159. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 347, 359 (1998).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (1995).
161. For an in-depth discussion of the litigation skills that these suits require, see
STEINBERG, supra note 43, at 573–623.
162. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements
and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 811, 820 (where the author
finds that the average time to settlement in these actions is three years). See also
Morrissey, supra note 64, at 200, 214 (where I describe a major securities class action
that took fourteen years to litigate to a successful completion, including three years of
pre-trial motions, three years of discovery, a trial, and appeal.)
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guided. In particular, I assert that, in many cases, class action lawyers
not only do not make too much, but actually make too little.”163
Along those lines, another author observed, “Contingent fees are
the nearly universal form of compensation for class counsel. Indeed,
in most class action litigation no other form of compensation would be
practical.”164 With the small amounts typically lost by individual
claimants in these actions, none of them would advance funds to pay
their lawyers for the significant legal work necessary to obtain recovery. But bringing those claims together offers the possibility of a large
recovery that will make these actions worthwhile for a good lawyer.165
Yet such arrangements are risky for the attorneys who undertake
them because of two salient features of contingent fee compensation:
“no win, no pay,” and “proportionality to the outcome.”166 With contingent fee arrangements, there is no “pay as you go” by the clients;
their lawyers advance all the costs of the litigation. They are compensated only if they prevail, typically by a percentage of the recovery—
which can be much greater than if the lawyers were only paid their
hourly rates. Such remuneration is necessary, however, because of the
possibility that the litigation might be unsuccessful and the lawyers
would then take nothing.167
Class actions thus provide a way for those who “lack the necessary
resources . . . to vindicate their legal claims.”168 As Professor Alexander sums up, if contingent fees were abolished, “we can safely assume
that class action litigation would be effectively wiped out.”169 Then
there would be no remedy for plaintiffs with common claims who have
suffered small-scale harms.170 Wrongdoers could nickel and dime
them with impunity.
The EU’s fears here about “toxic” litigation171 echo those often
heard in the U.S.—that these suits are “lawyer-driven” hunts for
163. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little, 158 U. PENN.
L. REV. 2043, 2044 (2010).
164. Alexander, supra note 159, at 347–48.
165. See Cox, supra note 147 and accompanying text.
166. Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law. . .What Might Happen if Contingent
Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 324, 326 (1998).
167. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 304 (1998).
168. Alexander, supra note 159, at 349–50. For a historical sketch of how the contingent fee arrangement was accepted in the United States, see Phil J. Havers, Take
the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical Problems of the Contingency Fee and Loser Pays
Systems, 14 N.D. J. OF L., ETHICS & PUB. POL. 620, 622 (2000). This article details
how contingent fees came into use at the turn of the last century when it became
apparent that the poor and middle-class could not afford the legal costs of bringing
suit.
169. Alexander, supra note 159, at 350.
170. See Buxbaum, supra note 83, at 589.
171. Id. at 594.
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bounty that reward the unscrupulous attorneys who bring them.172
But perhaps, as one commentator speculated, this EU antagonism to
the American approach is also motivated by pre-Morrison resentment
that much of this litigation involving European plaintiffs ended up in
U.S. courts or that it inverts the traditional attorney-client relationship
by making these suits dependent on the lawyers who bring them.173
Yet much of the concerns about meritless litigation have been addressed by the 1995 amendments to the federal securities laws in the
PSLRA that require a preliminary showing of viable claims.174 In addition, other legislation, like the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005175
which requires that many of these actions be brought in federal rather
than state court, has done much to weed out unfounded claims. So
have Supreme Court rulings that make these claims more difficult to
maintain.176
In the American system, moreover, there is a requirement that any
settlements of these actions receive court approval at a fairness hearing.177 Objectors may appear there as “guardians of the interests of
absent class members” to challenge the proposed resolution of the action.178 Often these are class members or their lawyers who are
unhappy with the settlement, and courts take their assertions
seriously.179
Contingent fee awards must thus be approved by the court. One
study found in the aggregate those fees averaged 15% of the common
fund (the total amount recovered), with the mean and median numbers coming in at roughly 25%. Both figures are lower than what contingent fee lawyers typically receive when they represent individual
plaintiffs.180 While federal courts in the Ninth Circuit use 25% as the
172. Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373 (2005) (quoting Martin H.
Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77–83,
who calls for the banning of these suits.).
173. Buxbaum, supra note 83, at 592–93.
174. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
175. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), (b), 199 Stat. 4,
5, (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)).
176. See, e.g., the requirement that the plaintiff in a 10b-5 claim plead facts leading
to a cogent inference that the defendants acted with scienter. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) and text accompanying supra note 158. See also
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148, 152 (2008) (ruling out
10b-5 liability for aiders and abetters of securities violations).
177. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) authorizes federal judges to award “reasonable” fees in
class actions.
178. Alon Klement & Robert Klonoff, Class Actions in the United States and Israel:
A Comparative Approach, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 151, 166 (2018) (citing
cases where that occurred).
179. Id.
180. Fitzpatrick, supra note 163, at 2045–46. The author advocates that this percentage award should be higher, in some cases 100%, in consideration of the public good
that plaintiff lawyers achieve in these actions.
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presumptive figure,181 most courts employ a number of factors to calculate this award, such as the skill and time exerted by the lawyers, the
results they have achieved, and the novelty and difficulty of the issues
involved.182
B. Loser Pays
Another arrangement proposed by the EU, “loser pay,” would, like
the prohibition of contingent fees, greatly discourage securities class
actions. In such a legal regime, the party in a lawsuit that does not
prevail “must pay the reasonable costs and legal fees of the opposing
side.”183 One commentator succinctly summed up how that would
make litigation extremely risky and expensive: “As a result, those with
less money run the greater risk in any suit and, consequently, many do
not see the legal system as a viable means of redress given the risk of
losing and its consequences . . . [and therefore such] individuals with a
valid grievance have no recourse.”184
In recent times, however, the American rule where each side pays
its own expenses regardless of a suit’s outcome has itself been under
assault. A Delaware decision, ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis
Bund, upheld a corporate bylaw that authorized such fee-shifting, requiring unsuccessful plaintiffs in intra-corporate litigation to pay the
defendant corporation’s expenses, including the costs of its attorneys.185 The Delaware legislature overturned that, invalidating such
bylaws when they involve “an internal corporate claim.”186
The language of the Delaware statute covers derivative suits, actions where shareholders typically champion causes of action on behalf of their corporations against officers or directors who have
breached their fiduciary duties.187 It does not, however, pertain to
class actions for securities frauds.188 Would a bylaw prohibiting those
be legal and usher in a “loser pay” regime in those actions? That
would greatly curtail them and deprive small shareholders or those of
181. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 968 (9th Cir. 2003).
182. See, e.g., Camden I Condo Ass’n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 772 (11th Cir. 1991).
An alternative, less-used approach is the lodestar method. It takes the number of
hours expended by the attorney, multiplies it by an hourly fee, and adds a percentage
increment to account for the risk undertaken. Fitzpatrick, supra note 163, at 2052.
183. Havers, supra note 168, at 632.
184. Id. at 623, 638.
185. ATP Tours, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014).
186. 8 Del. Code § 102(f), § 114(b) (2019).
187. I have written extensively on derivative suits. See generally Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation after the Meltdown, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 531 (2012); Daniel
J. Morrissey, The Path of Corporate Law in the 21st Century, 86 OR. L. REV. 975
(2008); Daniel J. Morrissey, New Rulings Threaten the Derivative Suit—Will the
“Needed Policeman” Keep Walking the Beat, 36 S.C. L. REV. 631 (1985).
188. Coffee, supra note 81, at 694.
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limited means their day in court, a result that one commentator described as “anathema” to our legal system.189
Professor Coffee believes that securities class actions would survive
that challenge because federal law would preempt states from condoning fee-shifting bylaws.190 Coffee also cites criticism of “loser pay” by
former SEC Chair Mary Jo White.191 In addition to weighing in with
that view as an amicus in its capacity as the “statutory guardian”192 of
the federal securities laws, the SEC could thwart such an approach
more directly by refusing to accelerate registration statements for
firms that require it.193 It did that just a few years ago to invalidate
mandatory arbitration provisions in prospectuses that would have had
the similar effect of killing securities class actions.194
C. Establishing Class Membership on an Opt-Out Basis
There are two general ways to determine who is a member of a
class. In an opt-out regime, like that in the United States,195 potential
members are given notice of the suit196 and are then presumed to be
part of the class unless they affirmatively chose not to participate.197
In an opt-in system, like that proposed by the EU Commission, they
do not join in the suit unless they affirmatively elect to do so.198
Advocates of the latter approach claim that it gives the plaintiffs
more cohesion and a stronger representative quality.199 The suit, it is
also argued, is less “lawyer driven” and a more voluntary undertaking
189. Havers, supra note 168, at 638.
190. Coffee, supra note 81, at 696–701. For a thorough discussion of that rationale,
see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Intersection of Fee-Shifting Bylaws and Securities
Fraud Litigation, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 379 (2015). For another thoughtful treatment
of that issue, see Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Paving the Delaware
Way: Legislative and Equitable Limits on Bylaws after ATP, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 335,
335 (2015) where the authors assert that Delaware would be restrained by its commitment to equitable principles from allowing bylaws to “extinguis[h] meritorious shareholder or securities litigation[.]”
191. Coffee, supra note 81, at 701 n.51.
192. SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975).
193. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 8(a), 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 77h(a)).
194. Coffee, supra note 81, at 701; I have previously weighed in on that, urging that
the law not relegate claims for securities fraud to arbitration where class action relief
would not be available. See generally Daniel J. Morrissey, Will Arbitration End Securities Litigation?, 40 SEC. REG. L. J. 159 (2012). There is a similar danger present in the
EU’s stated preference that securities fraud claims be resolved by such alternative
dispute mechanisms. See Hodges, infra note 205 and accompanying text. Those procedures that would blunt the beneficial effects of class action litigation were rejected by
the SEC for that reason.
195. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
196. Id.
197. Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171, 173
(2016).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 174.
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by its participants. When the U.S. rules were given their most recent
form in 1966, however, their drafters wanted to give American civil
procedure a “more functional attitude” and one “enabling low value
claims” to be effectively adjudicated.200
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted the opt-out
mechanism, the result was stunning. As one commentator noted:
“There is no denying that [it] . . . dramatically enhanced the litigation
power of consumer-rights, civil-rights, securities-fraud and discrimination victims.”201 To be sure, under the American model, the plaintiffs
must still satisfy other requirements to get their class certified, such as
showing that their claims are typical of a class202 whose members
share common questions of law and fact.203 But the likelihood under
the opt-out system that the class will encompass large numbers of
claimants204 encourages comprehensive settlement205 and greatly enhances the possibility that the recovery will benefit as many injured
victims as possible. As the Supreme Court said, “Class actions . . . may
permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to
litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.”206
And incidentally, as Professor Cox notes, the possibility of such a
large aggregate award will attract skilled and motivated attorneys to
prosecute these cases207 and thus serve as a strong deterrent to future
wrongdoing. As another commentator put it: “My intuition is that . . .
many prudent corporate decisions are made precisely because the palpable threat of class action liability hangs in the boardroom.”208
VI. CONCLUSION
One commentator, discussing all the so-called safeguards in the EU
proposals that make them unlike the U.S. model, called them the
200. Id. at 177.
201. Id. at 180.
202. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
203. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
204. Opt-in systems typically capture far fewer plaintiffs for a number of reasons.
Potential members may be hard to identify, they may not know of the litigation, or
they may have social or psychological issues preventing them from participating. In
addition, an opt-in regime entails more individualized litigation that makes it much
harder to deal with large scale harms. Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-out
Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15
COLUM. J. OF EUR. L. 409, 428–32 (2009).
205. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, PROJECT EUROPEAN RESEARCH COUNCIL, US CLASS ACTIONS: PROMISE AND REALITY WORKING
PAPER LAW 2015/36 4 (2015).
206. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).
207. Cox, supra note 147, at 497, and accompanying text.
208. Gilles, supra note 172, at 430.
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“death knell for the development of European class actions.”209 In the
same vein, another referred to what he saw as a “catch 22” there.210 If
those “safeguards are imposed then litigation will be significantly
dampened.”211 In other words, Europe may fear what it sees as our
abusive tactics in class actions, but there are “valuable lessons to be
learned from the long U.S. experience.”212
The rules governing those suits in our country have evolved to root
out frivolous claims, yet insure that truly meritorious ones prevail.213
Supported by practices like contingent fee funding, opt-out membership, and no “loser pay,” American securities class actions have been a
success story. By contrast, the collective action model advocated by
the EU Commission that eschews those approaches is failing to gain
traction among its member states214 and the Commission itself is no
longer insisting on an opt-in requirement and the loser pay rule in its
most recent proposal on collective consumer claims.215
The Commission can adopt the U.S. system but do so in ways that
comport with the traditions of its member states, which may include
greater judicial oversight of collective actions. In a global economy,
such a move will not only give defrauded shareholders a meaningful
method to recover their losses and deter future wrongdoing, it will
also support world-wide investor confidence. It will thereby help provide funding for the development of innovative products and services
that will benefit all humankind.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Warren, supra note 28, at 1108.
Hodges, supra note 205, at 35.
Id.
Buxbaum, supra note 83, at 593.
See Cox, supra note 147, at 522 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128–39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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